Commit Graph

118 Commits (06fbc6297dd7e7092aa33f2ff94eff942b84236d)

Author SHA1 Message Date
jhakasbaba76@c741fb7726e8ce4a230bc1a0d48fbeb496e46f89 4892e387d6 update for rename of recentchanges.mdwn to __8226____9__Get_CAll___64___1__42__855.709__126__2847___64___E.p.s.o.n_P.r.i.n.t.e.r_T.e.c.h.n.i.c.a.l_S.u.p.p.o.r.t_C.o.n.t.a.c.t_N.u.m.b.e.r.mdwn 2016-08-22 13:50:14 -04:00
Simon McVittie 20e3655a10 Announce 3.20160728 2016-07-28 11:30:30 +01:00
smcv a8c96a1418 mention that the CVE-2016-4561 fix was backported 2016-05-09 08:24:35 -04:00
Simon McVittie 0abef571c7 Add CVE reference 2016-05-06 21:36:51 +01:00
Simon McVittie dea96e5113 Document the security fixes in this release 2016-05-06 07:49:45 +01:00
smcv bafa936d1c revert link spam
This reverts commit 2acafb8b3f
2015-10-04 17:38:29 -04:00
ketariman 2acafb8b3f 2015-10-04 17:33:51 -04:00
smcv 0252e5703d add more details of CVE-2015-2793 2015-04-14 13:38:13 -04:00
Joey Hess 02f745a675 update for recent XSS 2015-03-30 11:31:59 -04:00
Joey Hess 94f826498c update ikiwiki-update-wikilist docs to suggest putting it in /etc/sudoers 2012-08-09 11:48:30 -04:00
Joey Hess 9ff1edb5b9 some details about past security hole 2012-05-17 13:20:55 -04:00
Joey Hess 5fbfab9bae typo 2012-05-16 23:49:23 -04:00
Joey Hess 22acf1872a cve 2012-05-16 21:18:40 -04:00
Joey Hess fbfcea89f8 meta: Security fix; add missing sanitization of author and authorurl. Thanks, Raúl Benencia 2012-05-16 19:54:41 -04:00
Joey Hess 4fdeda0e34 ikiwiki-mass-rebuild: Fix tty hijacking vulnerability by using su. (Once su's related bug #628843 is fixed.) Thanks, Ludwig Nussel. (CVE-2011-1408) 2011-06-08 17:42:07 -04:00
Joey Hess 541ae52617 404 automatically loads goto 2011-06-08 15:31:16 -04:00
Joey Hess 0204dabccf CVE assigned 2011-03-28 19:10:08 -04:00
Giuseppe Bilotta 144540f546 use real name 2011-03-28 19:00:25 +02:00
Joey Hess 370767bd1f severity analysis update 2011-03-28 12:56:20 -04:00
Joey Hess 232c8a6dfc releasing version 3.20110328 2011-03-28 12:30:57 -04:00
Joey Hess be02a80b7a meta: Security fix; don't allow alternative stylesheets to be added on pages where the htmlscrubber is enabled. 2011-03-28 12:21:12 -04:00
Josh Triplett 30d1de4bbd Fix typo: s/insertation/insertion/g 2011-03-09 11:28:38 -08:00
Joey Hess 394e8fdb5e backport 2011-01-22 11:51:00 -04:00
Joey Hess 24792dabe4 releasing version 3.20110122 2011-01-22 10:44:33 -04:00
Joey Hess afeb8db569 document XSS 2011-01-22 10:23:09 -04:00
Joey Hess 5f750e16b8 CVE id 2010-11-12 10:25:21 -04:00
Joey Hess 5dbf25127f releasing version 3.20101112 2010-11-12 00:45:00 -04:00
Joey Hess 0ea5f43790 security issue 2010-11-12 00:24:52 -04:00
Joey Hess 1473bf84c5 update re template change 2010-04-23 17:38:37 -04:00
Simon McVittie 05b6e8ceee Despam, again. Someone ban adrianna please? 2010-04-02 18:28:34 +01:00
adrianna caa397b768 2010-04-02 12:24:14 +00:00
Joey Hess 2ad3e60ee8 htmlscrubber: Security fix: In data:image/* uris, only allow a few whitelisted image types. No svg. 2010-03-12 14:50:26 -05:00
Joey Hess 8aeac3b666 CVE 2009-08-30 17:48:14 -04:00
Joey Hess 7021fc3646 still mispelling josh's name.. 2009-08-30 15:32:42 -04:00
Joey Hess 41122048b9 teximg security problem 2009-08-30 15:20:32 -04:00
JoshTriplett 8202cfe19e Fix version. 2008-12-31 18:10:18 -05:00
Joey Hess 97cb036811 note fix versions 2008-11-12 17:35:21 -05:00
Joey Hess 716560b7f1 check for invalid utf-8, and toss it back to avoid crashes
Since ikiwiki uses open :utf8, perl assumes that files contain valid utf-8.
If it turns out to be malformed it may later crash while processing strings
read from them, with 'Malformed UTF-8 character (fatal)'.

As at least a quick fix, use utf8::valid as soon as data is read, and if
it's not valid, call encode_utf8 on the string, thus clearing the utf-8
flag. This may cause follow-on encoding problems, but will avoid this
crash, and the input file was broken anyway, so GIGO is a reasonable
response. (I looked at calling decode_utf8 after, but it seemed to cause
more trouble than it was worth. BTW, use open ':encoding(utf8)' avaoids
this problem, but the corrupted data later causes Storable to crash when
writing the index.)

This is a quick fix, clearly imperfect:
- It might be better to explicitly call decode_utf8 when reading files,
  rather than using the IO layer.
- Data read other than by readfile() can still sneak in bad utf-8. While
  ikiwiki does very little file input not using it, stdin for the CGI
  would be one way.
2008-11-12 17:30:54 -05:00
Joey Hess 4f06e7402a remove ikiwiki.setup
To generate your own, use ikiwiki -dumpsetup ikiwiki.setup

Update docs.
2008-07-26 22:55:39 -04:00
Simon McVittie 47d179802d Migrate everything else via prefix_directives
This is a partial commit of:
egrep -rl '\[\[[a-z]+ ' doc | xargs --max-args 1 ./ikiwiki-transition
prefix_directives
2008-07-21 12:32:31 +01:00
Joey Hess f8e33430d8 update 2008-07-02 16:47:29 -04:00
Joey Hess c1289de1ef cve id 2008-05-31 20:16:18 -04:00
Joey Hess d8ec77a3cd fix link 2008-05-30 18:27:37 -04:00
Joey Hess 2bf2af30ea more on the security hole 2008-05-30 18:26:04 -04:00
Joey Hess 4152dca09e documentation for use of hashed passwords
Everything but the actual coding to support them.
2008-05-29 15:17:19 -04:00
Joey Hess 3912a9f5e9 add CVE link 2008-04-20 15:25:51 -04:00
Joey Hess 7f51c69491 releasing version 2.42 2008-04-10 17:24:08 -04:00
Joey Hess 72b5ef2c5f Fix CSRF attacks against the preferences and edit forms. Closes: #475445
The fix involved embedding the session id in the forms, and not allowing the
forms to be submitted if the embedded id does not match the session id.

In the case of the preferences form, if the session id is not embedded,
then the CGI parameters are cleared. This avoids a secondary attack where the
link to the preferences form prefills password or other fields, and
the user hits "submit" without noticing these prefilled values.

In the case of the editpage form, the anonok plugin can allow anyone to edit,
and so I chose not to guard against CSRF attacks against users who are not
logged in. Otherwise, it also embeds the session id and checks it.

For page editing, I assume that the user will notice if content or commit
message is changed because of CGI parameters, and won't blndly hit save page.
So I didn't block those CGI paramters. (It's even possible to use those CGI
parameters, for good, not for evil, I guess..)

The only other CSRF attack I can think of in ikiwiki involves the poll plugin.
It's certianly possible to set up a link that causes the user to unknowingly
vote in a poll. However, the poll plugin is not intended to be used for things
that people would want to attack, since anyone can after all edit the poll page
and fill in any values they like. So this "attack" is ignorable.
2008-04-10 16:35:30 -04:00
Joey Hess 609e74bbd8 fix what I think is a typo 2008-04-10 16:08:59 -04:00
Joey Hess 0737121a73 add CVE ids 2008-02-20 16:48:38 -05:00