92 lines
4.0 KiB
Markdown
92 lines
4.0 KiB
Markdown
Let's do an ikiwiki security analysis..
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If you are using ikiwiki to render pages that only you can edit, do not
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generate any wrappers, and do not use the cgi, then there are no more
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security issues with this program than with cat(1). If, however, you let
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others edit pages in your wiki, then some possible security issues do need
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to be kept in mind.
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## html attacks
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ikiwiki does not attempt to do any santization of the html on the wiki.
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MarkDown allows embedding of arbitrary html into a markdown document. If
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you let anyone else edit files on the wiki, then anyone can have fun exploiting
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the web browser bug of the day. This type of attack is typically referred
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to as an XSS attack ([google](http://www.google.com/search?q=xss+attack)).
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## image files etc attacks
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If it enounters a file type it does not understand, ikiwiki just copies it
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into place. So if you let users add any kind of file they like, they can
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upload images, movies, windows executables, etc. If these files exploit
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security holes in the browser of someone who's viewing the wiki, that can
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be a security problem.
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## exploting ikiwiki with bad content
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Someone could add bad content to the wiki and hope to exploit ikiwiki.
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Note that ikiwiki runs with perl taint checks on, so this is unlikely;
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the only data that is not subject to full taint checking is the names of
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files, and filenames are sanitised.
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## cgi scripts
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ikiwiki does not allow cgi scripts to be published as part of the wiki. Or
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rather, the script is published, but it's not marked executable, so
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hopefully your web server will not run it.
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## web server attacks
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If your web server does any parsing of special sorts of files (for example,
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server parsed html files), then if you let anyone else add files to the wiki,
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they can try to use this to exploit your web server.
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## --gen-wrapper might generate insecure wrappers
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ikiwiki --gen-wrapper is intended to generate a wrapper program that
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runs ikiwiki to update a given wiki. The wrapper can in turn be made suid,
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for example to be used in a [[post-commit]] hook by people who cannot write
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to the html pages, etc.
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If the wrapper script is made suid, then any bugs in this wrapper would be
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security holes. The wrapper is written as securely as I know how and
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there's been no problem yet.
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## symlink attacks
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Could a committer trick ikiwiki into following a symlink and operating on
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some other tree that it shouldn't? svn supports symlinks, so one can get
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into the repo. ikiwiki uses File::Find to traverse the repo, and does not
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tell it to follow symlinks, but it might be possible to race replacing a
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directory with a symlink and trick it into following.
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It would certianly be possible to start out with a directory, let ikiwiki
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run and find a file in there, then replace it with a symlink, and ikiwiki
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would then go ahead and follow the symlink when it went to open that file
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to read it. If it was some private file and was running suid, that could be
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bad.
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TODO: seems that locking to prevent more than one ikiwiki run at a time
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would both fix this and is a good idea in general. With locking, an
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attacker couldn't get ikiwiki to svn up while another instance was running.
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Even with locking, if an attacker has local write access to the checkout,
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they could still fool ikiwiki using similar races. So it's best if only one
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person can ever write to the checkout that ikiwiki compiles the moo from.
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## webserver symlink attacks
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If someone checks in a symlink to /etc/passwd, ikiwiki would publish that.
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To aoid this, ikiwiki will need to avoid reading files that are symlinks.
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TODO and note discussion of races above.
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## cgi security
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When ikiwiki runs as a cgi to edit a page, it is passed the name of the
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page to edit. It has to make sure to sanitise this page, to prevent eg,
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editing of ../../../foo, or editing of files that are not part of the wiki,
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such as subversion dotfiles. This is done by sanitising the filename
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removing unallowed characters, then making sure it doesn't start with "/"
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or contain ".." or "/.svn/". Annoyingly ad-hoc, this kind of code is where
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security holes breed. It needs a test suite at the very least.
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