Commit Graph

19747 Commits (40576191c7398dbcf9232d9bdfdb77c1da718bbd)

Author SHA1 Message Date
CRAZYBATMAN e24f874454 This reverts commit bda4eba674 2016-05-17 02:24:15 -04:00
https://id.koumbit.net/anarcat bda4eba674 and we have a bot 2016-05-16 22:41:42 -04:00
https://id.koumbit.net/anarcat 01eeb89d59 little irc integration plugin 2016-05-16 22:40:50 -04:00
https://id.koumbit.net/anarcat e13dc8bbc7 add details on bot setup 2016-05-16 17:40:24 -04:00
Simon McVittie 5f6f9a1bea Wrapper: allocate new environment dynamically
Otherwise, if third-party plugins extend newenviron by more than
3 entries, we could overflow the array. It seems unlikely that any
third-party plugin manipulates newenviron in practice, so this
is mostly theoretical. Just in case, I have deliberately avoided
using "i" as the variable name, so that any third-party plugin
that was manipulating newenviron directly will now result in the
wrapper failing to compile.

I have not assumed that realloc(NULL, ...) works as an equivalent of
malloc(...), in case there are still operating systems where that
doesn't work.
2016-05-11 09:18:14 +01:00
Simon McVittie 062dbf1373 3.20160509 2016-05-09 21:59:50 +01:00
Simon McVittie ab97cd56f3 Reference CVE-2016-4561 in 3.20160506 changelog 2016-05-09 21:57:34 +01:00
Simon McVittie 6879e37828 img test: exercise upper-case extensions for image files 2016-05-09 21:53:10 +01:00
Simon McVittie 2020bd88a5 Remove spurious changelog entry
This change was new in 3.20141016.3, but was applied to the master
branch several releases ago, so it is not new in 3.20160506.
2016-05-09 21:46:04 +01:00
smcv a8c96a1418 mention that the CVE-2016-4561 fix was backported 2016-05-09 08:24:35 -04:00
desci 176ff2fb5c Clarifying 2016-05-08 21:54:17 -04:00
desci dfcfefea74 Adding info regarding bootstrap classes 2016-05-08 21:53:14 -04:00
desci ed5ea6c303 Adding sites 2016-05-08 21:42:54 -04:00
Amitai Schlair 89af9ecc57 Detect image type from .JPG just like .jpg (etc.). 2016-05-08 18:31:02 -04:00
Amitai Schlair e24e6fed62 Fix spelling of "ratio" in test. 2016-05-08 18:31:02 -04:00
https://id.koumbit.net/anarcat 0ee5cb719c thanks! 2016-05-08 17:10:50 -04:00
smcv dca4461c11 tag added 2016-05-08 16:44:56 -04:00
https://id.koumbit.net/anarcat 590c42da03 thanks! 2016-05-08 16:40:13 -04:00
smcv 200a002ac5 sorry, one day I'll review this, but this is not that day 2016-05-08 16:37:34 -04:00
https://id.koumbit.net/anarcat 2576bceba2 still using this in production, would welcome feedback 2016-05-08 14:59:12 -04:00
https://id.koumbit.net/anarcat f80fdeb044 dropping this. 2016-05-08 14:57:28 -04:00
https://id.koumbit.net/anarcat c7364a0567 2016-05-08 14:56:26 -04:00
Simon McVittie 47b180e35f img: make img_allowed_formats case-insensitive 2016-05-07 23:22:52 +01:00
Simon McVittie 125461cab7 inline: expand show=N backwards compatibility to negative N
[[plugins/contrib]] uses show=-1 to show the post-creation widget
without actually inlining anything.
2016-05-06 22:51:02 +01:00
Simon McVittie 0abef571c7 Add CVE reference 2016-05-06 21:36:51 +01:00
smcv 855a7b5c6c respond 2016-05-06 15:29:51 -04:00
Simon McVittie cffc503e0c use intended filename 2016-05-06 20:16:58 +01:00
smcv dfadaa0bf9 escape directive properly; add paragraph breaks 2016-05-06 15:14:09 -04:00
smcv 455be983c0 rename todo/Correctly_handle_filenames_starting_with_a_dash_in_add__47__rm__47__mv.mdwn to bugs/Correctly_handle_filenames_starting_with_a_dash_in_add/rm/mv.mdwn 2016-05-06 15:12:49 -04:00
smcv f4b1244878 already fixed 2016-05-06 15:12:29 -04:00
Simon McVittie 26d4641d02 Announce 3.20160506 2016-05-06 20:10:19 +01:00
Simon McVittie 847c9f232e Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' 2016-05-06 20:05:45 +01:00
florian@883672f3f4dbd3c6bb430afc661484a58a3a1296 644d099e5a 2016-05-06 08:10:01 -04:00
Simon McVittie 9fe33a4c94 3.20160506 2016-05-06 07:54:47 +01:00
Simon McVittie f01283478b Exclude users/* from the HTML documentation 2016-05-06 07:53:53 +01:00
Simon McVittie 1ae01a592f Do not recommend mimetype(image/*)
Not all image file types are safe for general use: in particular,
image/svg+xml is known to be vulnerable to CVE-2016-3714 under some
ImageMagick configurations.
2016-05-06 07:49:50 +01:00
Simon McVittie dea96e5113 Document the security fixes in this release 2016-05-06 07:49:45 +01:00
Joey Hess 21b9b9e306 update test suite for svg passthrough by img directive
Remove build dependency libmagickcore-6.q16-2-extra which was only there
for this test.
2016-05-06 06:58:56 +01:00
Simon McVittie 984ba82f1b img: Add back support for SVG images, bypassing ImageMagick and simply passing the SVG through to the browser
SVG scaling by img directives has subtly changed; where before size=wxh
would preserve aspect ratio, this cannot be done when passing them through
and so specifying both a width and height can change the SVG's aspect
ratio.

(This patch looks significantly more complex than it was, because a large
block of code had to be indented.)

[smcv: drop trailing whitespace, fix some spelling]
2016-05-06 06:57:12 +01:00
Joey Hess 7ff6221ac9 changelog for smcv's security fixes
[smcv: omit a change that was already in 3.20160514]
2016-05-06 06:53:41 +01:00
Simon McVittie 170cd41489 img: check magic number before giving common formats to ImageMagick
This mitigates CVE-2016-3714 and similar vulnerabilities by
avoiding passing obviously-wrong input to ImageMagick decoders.
2016-05-05 23:43:50 +01:00
Simon McVittie 545a7bbbf0 img: restrict to JPEG, PNG and GIF images by default
This mitigates CVE-2016-3714. Wiki administrators who know that they
have prevented arbitrary code execution via other formats can re-enable
the other formats if desired.
2016-05-05 23:43:50 +01:00
Simon McVittie 54a9f8d07d img: force common Web formats to be interpreted according to extension
A site administrator might unwisely set allowed_attachments to
something like '*.jpg or *.png'; if they do, an attacker could attach,
for example, a SVG file named attachment.jpg.

This mitigates CVE-2016-3714.
2016-05-05 23:43:50 +01:00
Simon McVittie 32ef584dc5 HTML-escape error messages (OVE-20160505-0012)
The instance in cgierror() is a potential cross-site scripting attack,
because an attacker could conceivably cause some module to raise an
exception that includes attacker-supplied HTML in its message, for
example via a crafted filename. (OVE-20160505-0012)

The instances in preprocess() is just correctness. It is not a
cross-site scripting attack, because an attacker could equally well
write the desired HTML themselves; the sanitize hook is what
protects us from cross-site scripting here.
2016-05-05 23:43:17 +01:00
https://id.koumbit.net/anarcat 355ba85137 all good 2016-05-04 18:53:24 -04:00
smcv e874ce623b 2016-05-04 18:35:33 -04:00
https://id.koumbit.net/anarcat bd881a8ee6 response: confirmation it's a bug in MMD and Discount doesn't have footnotes, and request for workaround 2016-05-04 09:45:25 -04:00
smcv 291a09e537 discount (as used on this wiki) can do footnotes, but they aren't enabled by ikiwiki 2016-05-04 05:48:01 -04:00
smcv 337736663b response 2016-05-04 05:38:27 -04:00
Joey Hess f4b75b3b2c
response 2016-05-02 09:33:59 -04:00