s/sslrequire/requiressl/g
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@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ Config variables that affect the behavior of `unixauth`:
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* `unixauth_type`: defaults to unset, can be "checkpassword" or "pwauth"
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* `unixauth_command`: defaults to unset, should contain the full path and any arguments
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* `unixauth_sslrequire`: defaults to 1, can be 0
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* `sslcookie`: needs to be 1 if `unixauth_sslrequire` is 1 (perhaps this should be done automatically?)
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* `unixauth_requiressl`: defaults to 1, can be 0
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* `sslcookie`: needs to be 1 if `unixauth_requiressl` is 1 (perhaps this should be done automatically?)
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__Security__: [As with passwordauth](/security/#index14h2), be wary of sending usernames and passwords in cleartext. Unlike passwordauth, sniffing `unixauth` credentials can get an attacker much further than mere wiki access. Therefore, this plugin defaults to not even _displaying_ the login form fields unless we're running under SSL. Nobody should be able to do anything remotely dumb until the admin has done at least a little thinking. After that, dumb things are always possible. ;-)
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